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Abstract 
 
The economics of geographical indications (GIs) is assessed within a vertical product 
differentiation framework that is consistent with the competitive structure of the agricultural 
sector with free entry/exit. It is assumed that certification costs are needed for GIs to serve 
as (collective) credible quality certification devices, and production of high-quality product is 
endogenously determined. We find that GIs can support a competitive provision of quality 
that partly overcomes the market failure and leads to clear welfare gains, although they fall 
short of delivering the (constrained) first-best level of the high-quality good. The main 
beneficiaries of the welfare gains are consumers. Producers may also accrue some benefit if 
the production of high-quality products draws on scarce factors that they own. 
 
 
Keywords:  competitive industry; free entry/exit; geographical indications; Marshallian 
stability; quality certification; trademarks; welfare. 
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Introduction 
The market provision of quality is notoriously fraught with difficulties under asymmetric 
information: when producers cannot credibly signal the quality of their products, consumers’ 
choices are predicated on the perceived average quality on the market, and this pooling 
equilibrium has undesirable welfare properties. Following Akerlof’s (1970) seminal 
contribution, such market failures have been the object of considerable research. One 
possible solution has emphasized the role of firms’ reputation as conveyed by their brands 
(Klein and Leffler, 1981; Shapiro, 1983). Brand names must themselves be informative, of 
course, and that in turns requires a credible trademark system. Trademarks thus serve as 
useful information tools for consumers by allowing them to more readily identify the goods 
of interest, thereby reducing the possibility of consumer confusion and economizing on their 
search costs (Landes and Posner, 1987). Given that effect, trademarks also provide an 
incentive for firms to produce goods of consistent quality, as expected by consumers, lest 
they lose consumer loyalty and suffer a loss on their investments in trademark development.1 
Brands and trademarks are best understood in an imperfectly competitive setting. 
Their role in agriculture and food production, largely characterized by competitive market 
conditions, remains an open question. Individual firms are typically too small to credibly 
signal quality to consumers directly, and this is one of the justifications for specific types of 
government intervention such as the development of food standards and grades, a specific 
mandate of U.S. federal agencies (Gardner, 2003; Lapan and Moschini, 2007).2 Alternatively, 
producers could bundle together to achieve the critical mass required for brand name and 
trademark development. A particularly interesting instance of such cooperation in the 
provision of quality is represented by the use of geographical indications (GIs). This use of 
geographically based labels to brand products has been in use for a long time, especially in 
Europe, but interest in GIs increased considerably after they were recognized as a distinct 
form of intellectual property rights in the TRIPS agreement of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) (Josling, 2006). In the context of GIs, quality attributes of interest to 
consumers are presumed linked to the specific geographic origin of the good and/or 
particular production methods used in that region (the notion of “terroir”), and such 
attributes cannot be determined through inspection by the consumer prior to purchasing the 
good. The fundamental role of GIs in this setting, therefore, is that of providing a credible 
certification mechanism that solves a real-world information problem.  
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  Some recent contributions have addressed directly some of the specific economic 
issues related to GIs. Zago and Pick (2004) question the desirability of GIs by showing that, 
with an exogenously determined supply of quality, the welfare implications of a fully credible 
certification system based on GIs are ambiguous. In Anania and Nisticò (2004), low-quality 
producers can choose to sell their product on the high-quality market (i.e., to cheat). Given 
an imperfect enforcement mechanism, a GI regulation might be desirable for both low-
quality and high-quality producers. A few studies have suggested that GIs can be interpreted 
as “club goods” (non-rival, congestible, and excludable), as discussed in Rangnekar (2004, 
chapter 4), and this interpretation is adopted by Langinier and Babcock (2006). The 
government provides GI certification rights to high-quality producers, who are free to decide 
the size of the club (i.e., who among the high-quality producers has access to it). Lence, 
Marette, Hayes and Foster (2007) focus on the problem of developing new GIs. The key to 
developing such products is a fixed cost. Certification is implicitly free in their setting, and 
thus costless imitation is possible, so that some degree of supply control may be necessary to 
encourage geographic product differentiation.  
In this paper we emphasize that the natural institutional setting for GIs is that of 
competitive markets. Contrary to standard trademarks, which are owned and used by a single 
firm, GIs are essentially public goods and are used by many firms simultaneously. Moreover, 
the use of a GI cannot be denied to any producer in the specified geographical area, an issue 
that has been overlooked by previous work. Indeed, in the European Union (EU) where GIs 
are widely used, there are typically no limitations on which or how many firms can use a 
given GI (provided that all product specifications, including the geographical origin, are 
met). Similarly, in the United States where GIs are mainly protected as certification marks, 
any firm that meets the certifying standards is entitled to use the corresponding certification 
mark. Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the impacts of a credible GI 
certification system in a competitive market setting characterized by the possibility of free 
entry, and we derive and discuss the welfare effects to be expected in such a context.  
Our analysis complements and adds to existing studies in this area in some novel 
ways. For instance, most studies discussed in the foregoing (Zago and Pick, 2004; Anania 
and Nisticò, 2004; Langinier and Babcock, 2006) assume that producers are ex ante and 
exogenously identified as either of the low-  or high-quality type. In particular, high-quality 
producers supply the high-quality product regardless of whether or not they are certified 
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and/or received a price premium in the market. We relax this constraining assumption and 
allow the (costly) provision of quality to be endogenously determined. Furthermore, in our 
model the production of high- and low-quality goods can co-exist in equilibrium in the same 
area, which also captures a feature of the real world where not all producers in a given GI 
region take advantage of their right to supply the GI product. Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, we analyze explicitly the implications of competitive entry within a coherent 
model of quality certification through GIs, an issue that, to date, has not been addressed.  
In what follows we first review the institutional setting for GIs, with emphasis on 
policies implemented in the EU, a leader in the development and use of GIs. This allows us 
to substantiate our premise that both the letter of existing regulations and the observed 
practice in the predominance of cases suggest that the relevant market setting is a 
competitive one. In particular, entry of new firms that wish to produce GI-certified high-
quality goods is possible. Based on that, we then specify a model to study how the 
competitive structure of agricultural production affects the supply of quality in the presence 
of a mechanism that mimics the nature of a GI. The model, although by necessity very 
stylized, captures the essential elements of the problem at hand. In particular, the demand 
side of the model is rooted in the economics of product differentiation, which provides an 
attractive formulation on how consumer preferences value quality. On the supply side, our 
model allows for different production costs for high- and low-quality goods and permits the 
supply of the high-quality (GI-certified) good to be endogenous.  
 The characterization of equilibrium centers on the competitive conditions with free 
entry/exit. In the benchmark case, in which all input costs are parametrically given, the need 
for costly certification that involves a fixed cost induces increasing returns to scale at the 
industry level. Consequently, the competitive equilibrium is not Pareto efficient; specifically, 
it under-provides the high-quality good. This equilibrium, however, does entail welfare gains 
relative to the absence of GI certification, and thus it does ameliorate the information 
market failure that motivates interest in GIs. In this setting, some simple policies that 
subsidize the GI certification of quality would restore Pareto efficiency to the competitive 
equilibrium. Perhaps not surprisingly, given the long-run nature of the competitive 
equilibrium that we consider, the welfare gains due to GIs mostly take the form of increased 
consumer surplus. The availability of GIs benefits producers only when the production of 
the high-quality good draws on scarce factors owned by producers. 
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The Institutional Framework 
Whereas recent motives of interest in GIs stem from their recognition as distinct intellectual 
property rights in TRIPS and the ongoing efforts to strengthen such rights, protection of 
GIs has a long history in some European countries and elsewhere. GIs are protected under 
two similar yet distinct legal notions: appellations of origin and marks. The primary 
difference is that an appellation of origin requires the existence of a special tie between the 
quality of the product and its geographical origin, whereas in the case of a mark such a 
relation is not necessary.3 
 The EU framework is rooted in its Council Regulation (EEC) 2081/92, adopted in 
1992, which established an EU-wide harmonized system of protection of GIs for agricultural 
products and foodstuffs (but excluding wines and spirits).4 This regulation defines two types 
of GIs, Protected Designations of Origin (PDOs) and Protected Geographical Indications 
(PGIs), that differ depending on how closely a product is linked to geography (European 
Commission, 2007). Protection under a PDO mandates the more stringent conditions, as it 
requires that the quality or characteristics of the product must be essentially or exclusively 
due to natural and human factors characterizing the geographic area of origin (e.g., climate, 
soil quality, local production knowledge). Also, for a PDO the entire production process, 
including the production and processing of raw materials, must occur within the defined 
geographic area of origin. In contrast, the PGI merely requires that a portion of a designated 
product’s characteristics and production occur within the specific geographical area. 
PDO or PGI protection can be obtained by an association of producers and/or 
processors. The process requires the definition of so-called “specifications,” which identify 
the required conditions for the GI label, including the characteristics of the product, the 
production method, and the geographic area of production. In addition, the association 
seeking protection must designate a third-party inspection body in charge of the certification 
and inspection along the entire supply chain. Such activities are meant to ensure that 
products carrying PDO or PGI labels comply with the specifications and to ensure that the 
information conveyed via labeling is verifiable, thus bolstering the credibility of the GIs 
system. It is critical to note that once a product is registered, all producers within the 
geographic region who comply with the product specifications, regardless of whether or not 
they are a member of the association that originally applied for the registration, are entitled 
to use the PDO or PGI label on their product (Article 8 of Regulation 510/2006).5   
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Over 700 PDO and PGI products are currently registered in the EU. Table 1 reports 
their distribution by country and by product category. The majority of these GIs come from 
Mediterranean countries—more than 75 percent of the products are registered in five 
southern EU states (France, Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain). Nevertheless, the registration 
of GIs by northern countries has increased over time. Of the 268 applications for new 
denominations that are currently being considered, more than half come from countries 
other then the aforementioned five southern countries (including 11 from non-members 
countries).  
In most other developed countries outside the EU, the trademark system provides a 
legal framework for the protection of GIs. In the United States geographical names can be 
registered as certification marks. Certification marks are characterized by the fact that the use 
of the mark is not restricted to any person or entity, as long as the attributes required for 
certification are met. U.S. certification marks are typically administered by a governmental 
body, the presumption being that such an agency is best positioned for “… preserving the 
freedom of all persons in the region to use the term and, second, preventing abuses or illegal 
uses of the mark…” (USPTO, undated, p. 3).6 Similarly to the appellations system, the 
product that is labeled with a certification mark is subject to inspection. Inspection activities 
are in this case the responsibility of the mark’s owner and not of a third-party inspection 
body (but the implications are analogous because the owner of the certification mark does 
not conduct production or commercial activity; it merely concedes the use of the mark to 
independent producers).  
In some instances, GI protection in the United State can also be obtained through 
individual trademarks or collective marks. Specifically, that is possible when one can 
establish that the geographic term in question has acquired a “secondary meaning” to 
consumers. Collective marks identify the products of many firms belonging to a group (e.g., 
an association or cooperative). They are meant “for use only by its members …” (USPTO, 
undated, p. 4), and as such they arguably have the nature of club goods. 
TRIPS accords stronger GI protections to wines and spirits, and even in the EU 
wines are treated separately. “Quality wines produced in a specified region” and table wines 
with a “typical geographic indication,” excluded from Regulation (EEC) 2081/92, are 
protected within the framework of the common market organization for wine (European 
Commission, 2006). This framework limits the grape-growing potential of the European 
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Union with planting rights restrictions, including a ban on new vine plantings. These 
instruments have only been partially successful in trying to reduce the chronic 
overproduction in the EU (over the last two decades the stocks of the aforementioned 
protected quality wines have actually been growing at a faster rate than consumption and 
exports to third countries). In any event, planting rights restrictions apply to total cultivation 
of grapes and do allow shifting wine production into GIs, if desired. Indeed, over time, 
planting rights have been allocated or reallocated to higher-quality productions, increasing 
the incidence of GIs on total wine (European Commission, 2002).  
 
GI Product Markets and Competition 
The analysis of the institutional framework for the protection of GIs in the preceding 
section suggests that, typically, all producers located in the relevant specified production area 
have the option to produce and market the corresponding GI product. Thus, it would seem 
that competitive entry is a feature of the supply context of GI products that is fully 
consistent with most current regulations governing GIs.  
Despite the possibility of competitive entry/exit, of course, expanding production of 
a given GI may be hampered by limitations on the accessibility of relevant inputs. Given the 
great heterogeneity of existing GIs in this respect, no simple assessment is possible on how 
much such a consideration matters. For instance, if the geographic area identified by a given 
GI is sufficiently small, and/or the GI product accounts for much of the local agricultural 
production (e.g., Champagne), land and/or other factors may seriously affect potential 
supply response. In other cases, such as those of Greek feta cheese and Italian grappa, the 
appropriate geographic area encompasses virtually a whole country. The actual level of 
utilization of GI labels within a specified area of production also varies significantly among 
different GIs, and often a significant share of total production is commercialized without the 
GI label. For example, olive oil produced in the Italian region of Lazio involves about 
130,000 producers who grow olive trees on 195,000 acres. A GI label is used on less than 
10% of the olive oil that could potentially be branded with any one of the three regional GIs 
(Sabina PDO, Canino PDO or Tuscia PGI) (Carbone, 2003). Similarly, in the case of the 
Italian wine sector where a high degree of heterogeneity exists among different wines, the 
utilization of GIs is only about 40% (ISMEA, 2005). Thus, considerable expansion of 
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production of a number of GI wines would seem possible, even given the overall constraint 
posed by EU planting rights. 
If it were possible to manage GIs as privately owned labels with the power to control 
total supply, as in the notion of farmer-owned brands articulated in Hayes, Lence and 
Stoppa (2004), that might create the potential for attractive noncompetitive returns for GI 
producers. The lure of noncompetitive returns in agriculture is, of course, not new; it has 
been of interest to farmers for a long time, as evidenced by the history of the cooperative 
movement and marketing orders in the United States (Crespi and Sexton, 2003).7 Producer 
associations with direct responsibility for managing GIs (called “consortia” in Italy) are 
perhaps best positioned to pursue noncompetitive goals, especially when they gather most of 
the producers of the relevant GI product. In fact, antitrust authorities have intervened with 
regard to a number of prominent GI products: the Italian Parma ham and San Daniele ham, 
the Italian Grana Padano, Parmigiano-Reggiano and Gorgonzola cheeses, and the French 
Cantal cheese (OECD, 2000). The anticompetitive behavior investigated were attempts by 
producer associations to control total supply through the imposition of individual 
production quotas to their membership and through market share agreements between the 
consortia (OECD, 2000). In all cases, after the antitrust intervention, production quota and 
market share agreements were abandoned, and competitive conditions were restored.8  
A final consideration that will inform our modeling choice concerns the production 
technology of GI products. Whereas it is true that the geographic attributes of GIs are often 
critical to support their perceived higher quality, it should also be clear that there are other 
elements of the production technology that are part of a GI’s specifications and that affect 
not only quality but also the cost of production. To illustrate, consider the example of 
Parmigiano-Reggiano cheese. The specifications for this PDO require production to take 
place in a clearly delimited region of northern Italy but also mandate a number of other 
production constraints. These include restrictive cow-feeding guidelines; notably, it is 
forbidden to feed silage to cows that produce the milk used in manufacturing Parmigiano-
Reggiano (by contrast, use of silage is allowed in the production process of the other 
competing parmesan-type cheese, the Grana Padano). Such restrictions are deemed essential 
to achieve the desired cheese quality but are also known to increase considerably the cost of 
milk production, by approximately 20% by some estimates (de Roest and Menghi, 2000). 
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Similarly, PDO brie production requires manual techniques that may increase production 
costs by approximately 25% (Benitez, Bouamra-Mechemache and Chaaban, 2005). 
 We conclude that, for the case of most GI products, the presumption that GI 
producers have an effective way to control the aggregate quantity supplied of their product is 
not tenable. Thus, in the model that follows we will maintain the possibility of competitive 
entry in a setting in which producers can elect to supply either the GI product or its generic 
counterpart, and where the production of the GI product entails higher production costs 
than its generic counterpart. The implications of the fact that some necessary factors in the 
production of GIs may be in scarce supply will also be investigated.  
 
A Model for the Competitive Provision of Quality Using GIs 
The specification of the model that follows implements all the main features that appear to 
be relevant based on the foregoing review of the institutional framework and real world 
examples. Specifically, in the model: (i) consumers value quality as in the standard vertical 
product differentiation framework; (ii) producers can supply quality by undertaking 
production processes that are costlier than those required for the alternative, low-quality 
product; (iii) GIs can serve as (collective) quality certification devices, although for their 
function to be credible additional promotion and certification costs are required; and (iv) 
producers operate in a competitive industry (with free entry and exit). 
 
Demand: Vertical product differentiation  
As with other studies in this area, we presume that the quality to be supplied through the use 
of GIs is valued by consumers within the vertical product differentiation structure of Mussa 
and Rosen (1978). Specifically, we consider the simple unit-demand version of the vertical 
product differentiation model whereby each consumer buys at most one unit of the good in 
question and her preferences are described by the (indirect) utility function 
 
(1) 
0
q p
U
θ −⎧= ⎨⎩
if the good is bought
otherwise
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where q ++∈\  indexes the quality of the good, p ++∈\  is the price of the good, and the 
preference parameter ,θ θ θ +⎡ ⎤∈ ⊆⎣ ⎦ \  indexes consumer types. The hypothesis here is that 
of heterogeneous preferences for quality so that the population of consumers can be 
characterized by the distribution function ( )G θ  of the preference parameter. 
More specifically, suppose that there are only two possible qualities in this market, a 
“low” quality Lq  and a “high” quality H Lq q> .  If these two qualities are available at prices 
Lp  and Hp , respectively, where 0H Lp p> > , then the consumer decision problem is to 
select the action that yields the highest utility among the three possible options: 
 
(2) 
0
H H
L L
q p
U q p
θ
θ
−⎧⎪= −⎨⎪⎩
if the high-quality good is bought
if the low-quality good is bought
otherwise
 
 
To simplify the analysis, as in related studies in this area, we put further restrictions on the 
distributions of consumers. That is, we postulate that the distribution ( )G θ  is uniform and 
that [0,1]θ ∈ . The latter condition, in particular, implies that the market will be “uncovered” 
(i.e., as long as prices are strictly positive, some consumers with a low enough θ  will not buy 
anything). More specifically, let  
 
(3) ˆ H L
H L
p p
q q
θ −≡ −  
(4) L
L
p
q
θ ≡ . 
 
Throughout we will consider the typical case where ˆ0 1θ θ< ≤ ≤ . For that parametric 
case, consumers with ˆ[ ,1]θ θ∈  will buy the high-quality product, consumers with ˆ[ , ]θ θ θ∈   
will buy the low-quality product, and consumers with [0, ]θ θ∈   will buy nothing. For the 
population of M  consumers, market demand is readily obtained by integrating the unit 
demand of each consumer given the distribution of consumer types. For the uniform 
distribution assumption invoked earlier, the aggregate market demand functions are  
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(5) 1D H LH
H L
p pX M
q q
⎛ ⎞−= −⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
 
(6) D H L LL
H L L
p p pX M
q q q
⎛ ⎞−= −⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
. 
 
Sometimes it is convenient to work with the inverse demand functions. Inverting (5) 
and (6), for given quantities [ ]0,iX M∈ ( ,i L H= ) satisfying L HX X M+ ≤ , yields 
 
(7) ( )L L H HH H q X q Xp q M
+= −   
(8) 1 L HL L
X Xp q
M
+⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . 
 
Equations (7) and (8) display the market’s willingness to pay for the two qualities, for given 
supply levels, but also implicitly defines the willingness to pay for the “additional quality” 
that the high-quality good provides over the low-quality one. By using (7) and (8), the 
(inverse) derived demand for the additional quality ( )H Lq q− is 
 
(9) ( ) 1 HH L H L Xp p q q M
⎛ ⎞− = − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . 
 
Note that this (market) willingness to pay for the additional quality depends only on the 
quantity supplied of the high-quality good (because this quantity implicitly defines the 
marginal consumer that is indifferent between purchasing the high- or low-quality good).  
 
Supply: Competitive production of quality  
We presume a standard competitive industry populated by numerous (actual or potential) 
producers who behave as price takers, and each of whom can produce either the high-quality 
good or the low-quality good (or zero quantity). Initially we suppose that these producers are 
identical and are operating with a production technology that admits cost functions ( )H HC x  
and ( )L LC x  for the high- and low-quality goods, respectively, where 0ix ≥  (i=H,L) denotes 
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the level of firm’s output for either the low- or high-quality product. We assume that the 
cost functions ( )i iC x  are strictly increasing and display standard U-shaped average cost 
curves. In a long-run equilibrium with free entry and exit, therefore, firms will be operating 
at a strictly positive efficient scale. Furthermore, we assume that ( ) ( )H LC x C x> , 0x∀ > . 
The presumption that the high-quality good requires a costlier production process is rather 
intuitive, as discussed in the preceding section (e.g., more labor care, need for higher-quality 
inputs, need for additional inputs, restrictions on the use of some inputs, etc.).  
In addition to production cost, to market the high-quality good, producers need to 
undertake costly activities that credibly certify, in the eyes of consumers, the claimed higher 
quality. Such activities may relate to marketing, promotion and/or monitoring of production 
standards. In principle such activities should be open to each producer individually, as would 
be the case for firms marketing with individual trademarks, and we therefore allow for that 
possibility. But the case for GIs rests on the presumption that firms may not be able to 
muster the required resources to do that individually, i.e., there is scope for producers to act 
cooperatively in this regard. Hence, we interpret GIs as a common brand whereby producers 
can bundle together to share the marketing, promotion and certification costs that are 
necessary for a credible GI. This assumption is quite consistent with the existence of 
producer organizations that take an active part in the marketing of GI products, such as the 
consortia discussed in the preceding section. Specifically, we assume that producers share the 
GI promotion and certification costs via a charge per unit of output produced, so that the 
total cost of producing the GI-certified high-quality product is ( )H H HC x xα+ , where 0α >  
is the unit certification cost.9  
One of the reasons for the existence of an incentive for firms to share the costs 
required for a credible certification is that what these activities produce—consumer goodwill 
towards the product with the given GI—has the nature of a public good from the producers’ 
perspective. Some of the required costs are largely independent of the aggregate quantity of 
good that is eventually produced; this would be the case, for example, for activities 
connected to marketing, promotion and advertising, and overhead costs of the producer 
organization in charge of performing such functions. We measure the cost of such activities 
by 0F > . Other costs, however, are likely to depend on the amount produced. We contend 
that this is the case, in particular, for the portion of certification costs that are meant to 
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monitor production standards and prevent cheating and free riding. A credible certification 
system, in fact, must recognize (and deal with) the possibility that producers purporting to 
sell a GI product have an incentive to behave opportunistically (that is, they may claim to sell 
the high-quality good while producing the low-quality good). Producer organizations have a 
variety of mechanisms at their disposal to monitor and limit the opportunistic behavior of 
members. In our context, the challenge is to represent such activities explicitly, so that their 
effects on equilibrium can be assessed, and to do so in a parsimonious way that is consistent 
with the rest of the model. To that end, the enforcement mechanism that we postulate is a 
sequential “auditing game” (e.g., Rasmussen, 2007, pp. 85-87), as follows. 
A producer who wants to supply a quantity x  of certified, high-quality GI product 
has two strategies: to comply with the relevant GI specifications or to violate them (by 
producing the lower-quality good at cost ( ) ( )L HC x C x<  instead). In the enforcement 
mechanism that we envision the monitoring agency moves first by announcing an 
inspections policy { },Tφ , where [0,1]φ ∈  is the probability of inspection to verify that the 
product specifications are met (or, more precisely, φ  is the fraction of producers that will be 
subject to inspection), and 0T >  is a finite penalty that is paid if a producer fails the 
inspection. The individual producer then chooses whether to comply with or to violate the 
production specifications. Given this enforcement mechanism, the total expected cost to the 
producer associated with the “comply” strategy is ( )HC x xα+  (and the assumption, of 
course, of no errors at the compliance-verification stage), whereas the total expected cost is 
( )LC x x Tα φ+ +  if the “violate” strategy is used.10 Clearly, to induce compliance the 
minimum penalty needs to be at least as large as the production cost difference 
[ ( ) ( )]H LC x C x− . Specifically, for any given [ ( ) ( )]H LT C x C x> −  there exists an inspection 
probability [ ( ) ( )]H LC x C x Tφ ≡ −  that makes “comply” a best response strategy for the 
producer. Given that, and if the aggregate returns to producers from everyone complying 
(net of the cost of inspections) exceeds those of tolerating violation, then it is an equilibrium 
strategy for the monitoring body to adopt the policy { },Tφ  at the initial move stage.11 
The main point of the foregoing is that compliance is obtained with an inspection 
probability that is high enough, given the penalty level. But such a monitoring scheme is 
costly because it requires that firms be inspected with some probability. Specifically, we 
assume that the cost of each inspection that is carried out is proportional to the level of a 
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firm’s output, that is, Hxβ , where 0β > . Thus, the expected monitoring cost for each 
producer to be certified is Hxφβ .12 Note that, in this setup, the total monitoring cost is 
increasing in the number of producers to be certified, an appealing feature that is lost when 
total certification cost is treated as a fixed cost only.  
The remaining question concerns how many producer groups we should expect to 
see in a GI market. As stated earlier, our working assumption is that the full certification 
cost, as given by the fixed cost F  and the variable cost of monitoring, is shared among the 
members of the producer organization on a per-unit-of-output basis, with the portion of 
total cost attributable to the certification service written as Hxα . Thus, under full cost-
sharing (we will return to this issue later, in the context of possible policy implications), if 
there are n  producers sharing such costs, it must be that H Hx x F nα φβ= + . Given these 
structural assumptions, the question of how many producer groups we should expect 
reduces to a simple coalition formation problem. Suppose that, in a competitive equilibrium, 
there are HN  producers engaged in the production of the high-quality good, each producing 
the same quantity Hx , and consider the possibility of there being m  groups of size Hn N<  
(so that Hn N m≡ ), each independently promoting and certifying their high-quality product. 
Then this would be a stable coalition structure if no member can gain by switching 
coalitions, that is, by leaving its current group to join another group (making the latter of size 
1n + ). Thus, the hypothesized coalition structure would be stable if 
 
(10) 
( 1)H H
F Fx x
n n
φβ φβ+ ≤ ++ . 
 
But clearly this cannot hold. The larger coalition attains lower unit promotion and 
certification costs and pulls in new members, so that in equilibrium we are left with only one 
(grand) coalition of size HN .  
The other condition we need to check is the possibility that a member has of 
defecting from the coalition with the intention of supplying the high-quality product on its 
own. In such a case the producer has to undertake the entire fixed cost F  individually but 
saves the need for monitoring costs. This possibility is not profitable if  
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(11) 1 1( ) ( )H H H H H H H
H
Fp x C x F p x C x x
N
φβ− − ≤ − − −  
where 1x  is the scale of production of the firm that incurs F  individually.
13 For 
approximately equal production levels ( 1 Hx x≅ ) and a reasonably large number of producers 
HN , the condition is approximately HF xφβ≥ . Thus, as long as the fixed cost of 
certification is large enough relative to the monitoring cost, defecting to market the high-
quality product with one’s own trademark is not profitable. 
In conclusion, a credible certification system can be supported by a GI producer 
association that implements a simple monitoring scheme. Assuming that (11) is satisfied, a 
coalition may form to supply the high-quality good, and the process should lead to just one 
coalition of size HN .
14 Whereas in equilibrium the scheme may ensure compliance by 
producers, it will impose additional costs on the producers of the high-quality good. In 
particular, the total cost function for low-quality producers is simply ( )L LC x  whereas the 
high-quality firms have a total cost function of ( )H H HC x xα+ , where α  is the cost of GI 
certification per unit of output; that is,  
 
(12) 
H H
F
N x
α φβ≡ + . 
 
Equilibrium and Welfare 
In this section we consider the long-run partial equilibrium conditions that are relevant when 
it is possible for firms to enter and/or exit the industry of interest (e.g., Mas-Colell, 
Whinston and Green, 1995, chapter 10). Initially we assume no diseconomies at the industry 
level; that is, the prices of all production inputs are constant and exogenous to the industry. 
For a given output price Lp  of the low-quality good, low-quality producers choose the 
production level Lx  that maximizes profit ( )L L L Lp x C x− . The possibility of entry/exit 
drives profit to zero, so that each firm will be producing at the minimum efficient scale *Lx , 
that is, at the point that minimizes average cost: 
 
(13) { }* arg min ( )
L
L L L L
x
x C x x= . 
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Let * *( )L L L Lc C x x≡  denote the unit cost for the low-quality good at this efficient 
production scale. Then, the competitive equilibrium price for the low-quality good must 
satisfy15 
 
(14) *L Lp c= . 
 
As for the high-quality good, whether in equilibrium it will be supplied at all 
obviously depends on the level of the required certification cost, vis-à-vis the consumers’ 
willingness to pay for high quality. In an equilibrium in which the high-quality good is also 
supplied, for a given price Hp  individual producers choose the production level Hx  to 
maximize profit ( )H H H H Hp x C x xα− − . The possibility of entry and exit, however, requires 
the number of producers HN  to adjust to ensure the zero-profit condition (which, in turn, 
affects the per-unit certification cost α ). Hence, a long-run equilibrium needs to specify the 
equilibrium price *Hp , the equilibrium production level 
*
Hx  of each high-quality firm, the 
equilibrium number *HN  of high-quality firms, and the equilibrium per-unit certification cost 
*α . The required conditions are 
 
(15) * * *( )H H Hp C x α′= +  
(16) * * * * *( )H H H H Hp x C x xα= +  
(17) * * **H H
H
Fx x
N
α φβ≡ +  
(18) 
* *
* * 1 H LH H
H L
p pN x M
q q
⎛ ⎞−= −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
. 
 
Equation (15) is the optimality condition for firm-level profit maximization, whereas 
equation (16) displays the zero-profit condition due to the assumed free entry/exit 
possibility. For any given per-unit certification cost, these two equations in conjunction 
establish that the equilibrium production level *Hx  must satisfy 
* * *( ) ( )H H H H HC x C x x′ = . 
Hence, as for the low-quality producers, each firm in equilibrium produces at its minimum 
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efficient scale (the point that minimizes average cost). Let * *( )H H H Hc C x x≡  denote the unit 
production cost (not including the certification cost) of the high-quality product. Then by 
using equations (16) and (18), the equilibrium number of high-quality producers *HN  must 
satisfy  
 
(19) ( ) * * * *1 H HH L H L
H H
x N Fq q c c
M x N
φβ⎛ ⎞− − = − + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
. 
 
Thus, the equilibrium condition in (19) equates consumers’ demand for the additional quality 
provided by the high-quality good (relative to the low-quality good), as given by equation (9) 
 derived earlier, with the additional (industry) unit cost of producing this extra quality.16 
It is useful to note that, at the industry level, the per-unit certification cost is 
declining in the number of firms that produce the GI product (because of the assumed fixed 
cost of promotion and certification F ). The right-hand-side of equation (19) effectively 
defines the competitive “industry supply” function for the high-quality good. Under the 
usual assumption that a firm’s individual production is small relative to industry output, the 
individual firm takes the unit cost as parametrically given. Yet, at the industry level the 
industry’s unit cost of production is decreasing in the number of high-quality producers (i.e., 
decreasing in industry output). Any given firm exerts a positive externality on all other firms 
by sharing the fixed certification cost F  but does not internalize this benefit in its decision 
to enter/exit the industry. This positive externality is a source of increasing returns to scale. 
This fact is bound to have relevant implications for an equilibrium, but it is also the case that 
such an instance of parametric external economies of scale are quite consistent with the 
existence of competitive equilibrium (Chipman, 1970), although it does give rise to the 
possibility of multiple equilibria, as discussed next. 
Rather than solving for the equilibrium number of firms, one can equivalently solve 
for the equilibrium aggregate quantity of the high-quality product. Define * * *H H HX x N≡ . 
Then from equation (19), *HX  must be a root of the quadratic equation 
 
(20) ( ) ( )2* * 0H Hq X q c X FM φβΔ − Δ − Δ − + =  
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where, for notational simplicity, we define H Lq q qΔ ≡ −  and H Lc c cΔ ≡ − . The roots of this 
equation are given by the standard formula: 
 
(21) 
( ) ( )2 4
2
q c q c F q M
q M
φβ φβΔ − Δ − ± Δ − Δ − − Δ
Δ . 
 
The sign of the discriminant ( )2 4D q c F q Mφβ≡ Δ − Δ − − Δ  determines whether we have 
real roots and, if so, whether we have one or two roots. Note that 0dD dF <  so that, given 
the other parameters of the model, there exists ( ) ( )2 4F q c M qφβ≡ Δ − Δ − Δ  such that 
0D =  when F F= . In such a case there is only one real root to the equilibrium equation. 
When F F> , there are no real roots, that is, certification is just too costly and the 
competitive equilibrium does not include production of the high-quality good. When F F<  
there are two distinct roots for the quadratic equation, i.e., we have two candidate 
equilibrium solutions HX  and *HX . The case of F F<  is illustrated in Figure 1, where the 
linear downward-sloping curve represents the consumers’ willingness to pay for the 
“additional” quality, and the nonlinear decreasing curve represents the additional (industry) 
unit cost of supplying the high-quality good.   
 
Figure 1.  Equilibrium with F F<  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
H Lp p−
c φβΔ +
HX *HX
qΔ Stable equilibrium
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To distinguish between the two candidate equilibria when F F<  we appeal to 
stability conditions, but the choice of the relevant condition requires some care. Two 
concepts with a long history, conventionally labeled as Walrasian stability and Marshallian 
stability, differ in terms of what variable is viewed as changing in a situation of 
disequilibrium.17 Whereas the two stability concepts agree when demand and supply 
functions have the usual slope, they yield conflicting conclusions when the supply curve is 
sloping downward (in our case the equilibrium associated with HX  is Walrasian stable, 
whereas the equilibrium associated with *HX  is Marshallian stable). An important element, in 
such a situation, concerns why the supply function is downward sloping. When the negative 
slope reflects the existence of industry-wide external economies (the so-called forward-
falling supply curve, as opposed to the case of individual backward-bending supply curves), 
Marshallian stability is arguably more appropriate, and indeed supported by strong 
experimental evidence (Plott and George, 1992). Accordingly, in this study we rely on 
Marshallian stability and thus identify *HX  as the stable equilibrium of interest. We should 
also note that the Marshallian stability concept, with its reliance on output adjustment, is 
appealing in a production context such as ours that allows for firms’ entry and exit. For 
example, if the supply of high-quality product were to be to the left of *HX , then high-
quality producers would be making positive profits, which would stimulate entry and thus 
expansion of the high-quality supply.  
The competitive stable equilibrium satisfies some intuitive comparative statics 
properties. In particular, for the case of F F< , * 0, ,iX M i H L∂ ∂ > =  (a ceteris paribus 
increase in the market size increases the equilibrium quantities of both goods);18 
* *0H LX F X F∂ ∂ < < ∂ ∂ (e.g., a decrease in the fixed cost of certification F  increases the 
equilibrium level of the high-quality good); * *0H LX q X q∂ ∂Δ > > ∂ ∂Δ  (e.g., a larger quality 
markup for the GI product increases the equilibrium level of this good and decreases that of 
the low-quality good); and * *0L HX Xβ β∂ ∂ > > ∂ ∂  (e.g., a larger unit monitoring cost 
decreases the equilibrium quantity of the high-quality product and increases that of the low-
quality product). The impact of cΔ  is, of course, qualitatively the same as that of the 
monitoring cost parameter β .  
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Welfare  
One way to articulate the welfare implication of a GI mechanism is to suppose that the high-
quality good is technologically feasible but institutional constraints (e.g., lack of legal 
protection for the right to use the GI) prevent the establishment of a coalition of producers 
that can credibly deliver the high-quality good in a competitive fashion. Relaxing such 
constraints would bring about a new equilibrium with both goods being supplied. Before the 
introduction of a GI, only the low-quality good is supplied, with the competitive equilibrium 
condition *L Lp c= . After the introduction of a GI, consumers who do buy the high-quality 
good in equilibrium are better off, whereas consumers who continue to buy the low-quality 
good are unaffected. The welfare properties of the GI equilibrium can be illustrated as in 
Figure 2, which relates the equilibrium outcome that we have characterized to the vertically 
differentiated demand structure of the model. The downward-sloping lines of Figure 2 
depict the marginal utility functions of the population of M  consumers, as implied by the 
preference structure in (2) (along with the assumption that the preference parameter θ  is 
uniformly distributed on [0,1] ). Total consumer surplus is given by the shaded areas.  
 
Figure 2.  Consumer welfare in equilibrium 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
Hq
Lq
*
L Lp c=
*
Hp
same marginal surplus
*
HX
*
H
Fc
X
φβ= Δ + +
*
LX
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Of course, to compute the gain in consumer surplus due to the GI mechanism one 
needs to consider that consumers who buy the high-quality good, in this equilibrium, would 
still enjoy some surplus if only the low-quality good were supplied. The difference between 
the two measures is positive whenever the GI equilibrium entails both types of goods being 
supplied. This could be readily established analytically, given the structure of our model, but 
a graphical illustration can suffice. Specifically, the shaded area in Figure  3 illustrates the 
welfare (consumer) gains from the introduction of a GI by using the demand for the 
additional quality of equation (9) employed earlier to characterize equilibrium.  
 
Figure 3.  Gains in consumer surplus (case of F F< ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In conclusion, the foregoing analysis has established that the following implications 
are derived from the model. First, there are no profits to producers in equilibrium (as one 
would expect in a long-run competitive model with entry). Second, consumer surplus is 
affected by the availability of the high-quality GI product. Any institutional change that 
makes GIs feasible could results in sizeable benefits to consumers (even without returns to 
producers). Finally, only consumers of the high-quality good derive additional welfare from 
the establishment of a GI. 
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Pareto efficiency 
Not surprisingly, given the existence of (industry) external economies in this setting, the 
competitive equilibrium fails to deliver the constrained first-best outcome. What we mean by 
the qualification “constrained” here is the choice 0HX  that a benevolent social planner would 
implement, conditional on having to undertake the same certification costs as in competitive 
equilibrium. To derive such a first-best allocation, denote with WΔ  the gain in welfare 
brought about by production of the quantity HX  of the high-quality good, relative to zero 
quantity of this good (the no-credible-certification situation). Given the structure of this 
model, 
 
(22) ( )2
2
H H
H
X XW q c X F
M
φβ⎡ ⎤Δ = Δ − − Δ + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . 
The optimality condition for a maximum of WΔ  reduces to equating the marginal benefit of 
the high-quality product to its marginal cost (provided that 0WΔ ≥ ), yielding the first-best 
solution  
 
(23) ( )0H q cX Mq
φβΔ − Δ −= Δ . 
 
It is readily verified that, at 0HX ,  0WΔ ≥  requires the fixed costs of certification to satisfy 
0F F≤ , where  
 
(24) ( )20
2
MF q c
q
φβ= Δ − Δ −Δ . 
 
Hence, if the fixed certification costs are too high (i.e., 0F F> ), provision of the high-
quality good is not desirable. But for 0F F≤  it is socially desirable to supply the high-quality 
good by the given quality-certification technology, and in that case the optimal provision of 
the high-quality good ought to be at the efficient level 0HX  given by equation (23).  
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 It is now apparent that the competitive equilibrium falls short of the first-best 
allocation in two ways. First, because 0 2F F F= > , then if the fixed cost parameter falls in 
the domain 0( , )F F F∈ , the competitive equilibrium entails * 0HX =  and yet it is strictly 
socially desirable to have some high-quality good supplied. Second, even when a competitive 
equilibrium exists with * 0HX >  because F F≤ , the competitive equilibrium delivers a 
suboptimal level of output, that is, * 0H HX X< , as can be readily verified by comparing the 
solution in equation (23) with the larger of the two roots in equation (21) (see Figure 3). 
 The failure of the competitive equilibrium to deliver the first-best outcome could be 
remedied by simple subsidy policies. In the domain F F≤ , the under-provision of the high-
quality good is due to the fact that producers who pay a share *HF X  of the fixed costs of 
certification treat that as a marginal cost of production (and specifically do not internalize 
the contribution of their decision to enter the industry on the other firms’ cost of 
production). One way to support the first-best outcome via the competitive equilibrium 
would be to provide a lump-sum subsidy to the producer association (e.g., the consortia) 
equal to the fixed cost F  of quality promotion. Alternatively, the government could 
subsidize production by a unit subsidy 0Hs F X≡ , thereby offsetting the portion of 
certification costs due to existence of a fixed cost of certification.  
The suggestion is sometimes offered that to provide incentive for producer 
organizations to engage in the type of marketing and promotion required for a successful 
GI, it might be desirable to grant market power (i.e., the right to control supply) to producer 
associations in charge of GIs. In the model of Lence, Marette, Hayes and Foster (2007) this 
result arises from the assumption that a fixed cost is required to develop such products (very 
much as in our setting) and that there are no certification costs per se. Because costless 
imitation is possible in that context, some degree of supply control may be necessary 
(depending on the size of the required fixed cost) to encourage producers to develop a 
geographically differentiated agricultural product. Auriol and Schilizzi (2003), on the other 
hand, emphasize that certification costs are critical to achieve credibility. Our model 
explicitly accounts for the monitoring costs needed for credible certification, and in this 
context we find that market power cannot improve welfare. Specifically, if F F≤ , a 
competitive equilibrium exists, although it under-produces relative to the first best; granting 
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market power to a club of high-quality producers would not help, and actually would make 
matters worse by further reducing the quantity supply away from *HX  (and raise the thorny 
question of who, among the ex ante identical producers, should benefit from the ensuing 
noncompetitive profit). Likewise, if F F> , the competitive equilibrium entails * 0HX = , but 
in this parametric case the right to control supply is worthless to a producer association (the 
industry average cost is everywhere above the relevant consumer demand).  
 A final observation might be appropriate at this juncture. We have seen that the 
failure of the competitive equilibrium to deliver the first-best outcome is very much related 
to the existence of the fixed cost F . Insofar as this type of cost is interpreted as the cost of 
marketing and promotion, to convince consumers that indeed the GI product in question is 
a high-quality product, the public authorities’ endorsement of the GI system (as with the 
PDOs in the European Union) might be construed as a policy that attempts to lower the 
firms’ fixed cost of promotion (by conveying relevant information to consumers) and thus 
can contribute to the efficient competitive provision of quality in agricultural markets.19  
 
Upward-Sloping Industry Supply 
The fact that there are no returns to producers in the foregoing model is predicated on two 
things: the assumed long-run competitive structure (i.e., with freedom of entry/exit), and the 
constancy of unit costs (no diseconomies at the industry level). The latter is of course 
questionable, and in fact we typically think of competitive aggregate supply functions in 
agricultural markets as being upward-sloping. Upward-sloping supply functions can arise when 
the inputs used by the industry are in limited supply (e.g., land) and their price is affected by 
the competitive demand of the industry of interest. One way to make this concept operational 
is to endogenize the price of the (otherwise homogeneous) input with upward-sloping supply 
(e.g., Hughes, 1980; Lapan and Moschini, 2000). Alternatively, as in Panzar and Willig (1978), 
one can presume that all firms differ in their endowment of a fixed input (e.g., location, or soil 
quality) that has no alternative use outside the industry of interest.  
 
Constant marginal cost of high quality 
Following the approach of Panzar and Willig (1978), let’s continue to suppose that firms 
have an optimal efficient scale equal to 0x > , and that the firms are endowed with a fixed 
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factor [0, )η∈ ∞  that affects production costs (alternatively, η  can be interpreted as a firm-
specific efficiency parameter). Specifically, the unit production cost for the low-quality good 
is written as ( )Lc η , with ( ) 0Lc η′ ≥ . The industry supply curve of the low-quality good, 
consequently, is upward sloping, because increased output can only come about by the 
production of less and less efficient firms. This is illustrated in Figure 4 below.  
 
Figure 4. Upward-sloping supply and constant marginal cost of high quality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now suppose that the production of a high-quality good requires additional costs, so 
that the unit cost is 
 
(25) ( ) ( )H Lc cη η κ≡ +  
 
where κ  is a constant. Hence, here we assume that the extra cost required to produce the 
high-quality good is independent of the efficiency parameter η . With this condition, the 
equilibrium condition in equation (20) still applies. Specifically, the equilibrium when the 
parameters of the model are such that both goods are supplied is illustrated in Figure 4. 
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Note that in this case producers do enjoy a non-zero producer surplus in 
equilibrium. But this return to producers does not depend on the production of the high-
quality GI product and would be the same even if only the low-quality good were to be 
supplied. The area * * *( )H L Hp p X−  in equilibrium simply accounts for the additional 
production cost required for the high-quality product, and for the need for marketing and 
monitoring to deliver a credible GI certification for the high-quality good. 
 
Increasing marginal cost of the high-quality good 
More generally, one could postulate that the supply of additional quality ( )H Lq q−  is also 
upward sloping. To make the implications of that condition most transparent, suppose that 
the production cost of the low-quality good is constant and equal to Lc , but the production 
cost of the high-quality good depends on the firm-specific efficiency parameter η , that is, 
 
(26) ( ) ( )H Lc cη κ η≡ +  
 
where Lc  is a constant and ( ) 0κ η′ ≥ . In such a case there are clearly no aggregate producer 
returns to producing the low-quality good, and the possibility of offering the high-quality 
good can bring about positive returns to producers (as well as returns to consumers).  
The equilibrium determination of the high-quality production in our setting is best 
illustrated via the demand for quality upgrades used to characterized equilibrium. This is 
shown in Figure 5, where the shaded areas denote the changes in producer and consumer 
surplus brought about by the production of the high-quality GI product. Thus, it is certainly 
possible for the introduction of GI certification to benefit directly the producers of the high-
quality product, consistent with the view of those advocating the use of GIs as a tool for 
rural development. Our model, however, makes clear that such an outcome is by no means 
guaranteed, and it depends critically on the underlying structure of the agricultural 
production sector. Specifically, what is required is that production of the high-quality 
products requires specialized inputs in scarce supply. Exactly how that characterizes real-
world GI settings, of course, depends on the particular case at hand.  
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Figure 5. Upward-sloping supply due to increasing marginal cost of high quality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
In this paper we have developed a model that treats GIs as an effective certification tool for 
high-quality products that attempts to overcome the very real information problem that 
consumers face when quality cannot be readily ascertained prior to purchasing. This problem 
is arguably particularly relevant to food products that originate from a fragmented 
production structure, where individual farmers are too small to muster a credible quality-
signaling effort. One of our major points is that the competitive structure that justifies the 
need for producers to act collectively, as with GIs, also carries implications for the market 
equilibrium that arises with a credible GI mechanism. Thus, our analysis has emphasized the 
implications of a competitive equilibrium with the production of GI products, including the 
freedom of entry/exit in the production of the high-quality good. Our model has also 
maintained an attractive cost structure for the case at hand (higher-quality GI products are 
costlier to produce than their generic counterparts), and explicitly models the promotion and 
monitoring activities required to make the GI a credible certification system. In addition, the 
demand for GI products is modeled in a vertical product differentiation context. This 
captures the likely heterogeneity of consumer preferences vis-à-vis GI products but also 
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permits generic products to interact meaningfully with GI products both in the demand and 
in the supply side of the model.  
The main conclusions of our analysis can be summarized as follows. First, it is 
possible to have competitive provision of quality in agricultural markets, through 
certification devices similar to geographical indications. Second, although a competitive 
equilibrium can exist, because the GI certification entails fixed costs shared by all high-
quality producers, there are external economies of scale at the industry level and the 
competitive equilibrium is not Pareto efficient. In particular, the competitive equilibrium 
under-provides the high-quality good. The failure of the competitive equilibrium to achieve a 
constrained first-best outcome can be corrected by policies that subsidize the certification of 
the high-quality good. Also, we find that measures that allows for market power (i.e., supply 
control) for GI producer associations in this setting are not desirable. Finally, the 
implications of entry in a competitive framework are critical. The possibility of entry has 
been neglected in many previous studies, but, as we have shown, its consideration has 
important implications for the welfare results that may be deduced. In particular, whereas 
the resolution of the “lemons” problem that the credible certification through GI makes 
possible clearly benefits consumers, what it does for the welfare of producers in a 
competitive setting ultimately depends on the presence of scarce factors that they own.  
Whereas it is hoped that this paper has contributed to the clarification of some basic 
economic effects associated with the use of GIs as quality certification devices for 
agricultural products, the analysis that we have proffered has some limitations. In particular, 
we have analyzed the case of a closed economy and considered the role of one GI system in 
isolation. Among the interesting additional questions that arise, one may want to consider 
the interaction and competition of several GIs, possibly from different geographic regions in 
the same country/jurisdiction, and/or the interaction of GIs and other quality labeling (e.g., 
organic food labels), including the issue of possible excessive label proliferation. Also, as 
noted earlier, GIs are of interest in the ongoing WTO negotiation and their implementation 
is a question of intense disagreement among countries (Fink and Maskus, 2006). Developed 
countries are themselves divided on this topic, with a simmering transatlantic dispute rooted 
in contrasting approaches to trade, intellectual property and agricultural policy (Josling, 
2006). A variety of perspectives are invoked as germane in this setting, ranging from familiar 
economic arguments for intellectual property protection (Moschini, 2004) to the view of GIs 
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as a tool to safeguard cultural heritage and to foster the preservation of traditional methods 
of production (Broude, 2005). Thus, it may be desirable to explore the international trade 
implications of the expanding reach of GIs, addressing explicitly the current WTO 
negotiation. Such desirable extensions, which are the object of current research, should 
benefit from the benchmark analysis presented in this paper. 
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Footnotes 
                                                     
1 This standard result of reputation models was anticipated by Akerlof (1970, p. 499), who 
noted that “Brand names not only indicate quality but also give the consumer a means of 
retaliation if the quality does not meet expectations.”   
2 Two recent instances of government intervention in food and agricultural products labeling 
are the introduction of new organic food standards by the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) in October 2002, and the new regulation for labeling genetically modified food and 
feed products in the European Union in April 2004. 
3 More details and discussion of the GI institutional framework may be found in OECD 
(2000) and Josling (2006). 
4 Regulation 2081/92 was recently updated by Council Regulation (EC) 510/2006 to comply 
with the TRIPS agreement. It abrogates the “reciprocity principle” and it simplifies the 
bureaucratic procedure for application. In particular, it simplifies the procedure for third-
country parties to apply for GI registration in the EU and/or to pursue opposition against 
the EU registration of any GI. 
5 An example to illustrate the foregoing is the Italian cheese Asiago. The protection of the 
Asiago denomination under Italian law dates back to 1954, while the PDO status was 
obtained in 1996. The Asiago production area comprises a vast region in north-eastern Italy, 
encompassing four provinces (Trento and Vicenza, and parts of the lowland provinces of 
Padua and Treviso). Physical and sensorial characteristics as well as production procedures, 
from cow-feeding to the cheese ripening process, are outlined in detail in the production 
specifications. Local know-how and traditions (documented as far back as 1,000 AD) are 
deemed to be key element in the production of Asiago cheese. The “Consorzio Tutela 
Formaggio Asiago” is in charge of supervision, custody, promotion, and development of the 
denomination. Non-members are free to brand their product as Asiago PDO as long as 
production occurs according to the specifications and the product is certified by the 
appointed third-party inspection body. Control and inspection activities of Asiago producers 
(both consortium members and nonmembers) are performed by an independent inspection 
body (the “Certificazione Qualità Agroalimentare s.r.l.”). 
6 A well-known example of a U.S. certification mark is that of Vidalia onions, which is held 
by the Georgia Department of Agriculture (Clemens, 2002). Producers must apply for an 
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annual license from the Georgia Department of Agriculture to sell Vidalia onions, providing 
information regarding the type of onions planted, total number of acres and location. 
Licenses are free. The production area covers all or part of the 20 Georgia counties. 
7 For example, Vidalia onions, mentioned earlier, have had a federal marketing order since 
1989. The order’s provisions endow growers with some supply control. The effects of the 
marketing order, of course, are conceptually distinct from those of the certification mark.  
8 Consortia used to carry out monitoring activities to ensure that members’ production 
satisfies the desired specifications. After the introduction of the 1992 EU regulation on GIs, 
however, consortia lost any authority they might have had over the control of production, as 
well as the responsibility for all inspection activities (which were assigned to independent 
bodies). In particular, when awarded a PDO or PGI, consortia had to give up their property 
right over the protected name in exchange for the legal protection of the GI provided by the 
European regulation (Nomisma, 2001). At present, consortia have custody of the collective 
brand identifying the GI and grant its use to producers who meet the requirements. 
9 An alternative assumption might be a cost-sharing rule that takes the form of a per-firm 
charge. As long as firms are identical, as postulated here, the two assumptions would appear 
largely equivalent. The sharing rules that we follow does, however, simplify the 
characterization of long-run equilibrium (because the minimum efficient scale of the high-
quality firms is not affected by the size of α ). Also, the assumed rule might be more 
appealing when the model is generalized to allow for firm heterogeneity. 
10 The presumption is that there is no error in the inspection/auditing activities. Anania and 
Nisticò (2004) also rely on a similar simple and error-free monitoring and enforcing scheme.  
11 In this Nash equilibrium the monitoring agency must carry out the inspections, even 
though in equilibrium compliance is obtained. Thus, we are assuming that the monitoring 
authority can credibly commit to carrying out inspections, consistent with the overall 
requirement of a certification system that needs to be credible in the eyes of the consumer. 
12 Because only the product Tφ  matters to induce compliance, and because φ  affects the 
monitoring cost whereas T  does not (in equilibrium everyone complies and no penalty is 
assessed), ideally one would want to make T  as high as possible and φ  as small as possible. 
The existing legal and institutional framework (as well as firms’ limited financial assets), 
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however, likely puts bounds on how large T  can be; given that level of T , the inspection 
frequency φ  can in principle be calculated. 
13 The production level of the firm that incurs F  individually would differ from that of the 
firm sharing costs because its cost structure is changed (it incurs a fixed certification cost 
instead of a unit certification cost).  
14  Note that the underlying presumption of a competitive market is maintained throughout. 
Taking for given the U-shaped cost structure at the farm level that we have assumed, an 
alternative hypothesis would be to allow the merger of several farms/plants to be run as a 
single firm, thereby allowing the fixed cost F  to be shared over a larger (private) output that 
could then be marketed with a firm’s own trademark. Such a hypothesis, of course, would 
lead to an oligopolistic market structure. We rule that out by assumption because such a 
strategy would raise difficult agency problems of its own. Allen and Leuck (1998) provide a 
convincing account of why farming has generally not changed from small family-based firms 
to large corporate firms. Indeed, the reasons that slant the tradeoff between moral hazard 
and specialization in favor of small farming operation are likely to be even more compelling 
in the context of producing the kind of high-quality products identified by the traditional 
specifications of GI products.  
15 Here and in what follows we abstract from the possible “integer” problem (technically, a 
nonconvexity) that arises when the firms’ efficient scale is strictly positive, so that, strictly 
speaking, the long-run industry supply correspondence is an integer multiple of the efficient 
scale.  
16  In an equilibrium in which both the high- and the low-quality products are supplied, the 
zero-profit condition of course ensures that firms are indifferent as to which of the two 
goods they produce.  
17 Walrasian stability posits a price change in response to excess demand at that price, 
whereas Marshallian stability supposes that quantity adjusts when supply and demand prices 
differ at that quantity (e.g., Silberberg, 1990, chapter 19).  
18 The comparative statics properties can be used to further illustrate the choice of the 
relevant stability concept by noting that the Walrasian-stable solution HX  would produce 
rather counterintuitive results. For example, 0HX M∂ ∂ <  (an increase in the market size 
decreases the equilibrium quantity of the high-quality good). 
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19 The EU assists member countries in financing measures to promote agricultural products 
and food both in the EU internal market and in third countries; see Council Regulation (EC) 
2826/2000 and Council Regulation (EC) 2702/1999. These measures include information 
campaigns on EU quality and labeling systems, in particular on the EU system of PDOs and 
PGIs, and the EU system of quality wines produced in specified regions. The EU finances 
50 percent of the cost of these measures, the remainder being met by producer organizations 
and/or member states. The current triennial program targeting the internal market has a 
total budget of €50.9 million. A third-country program targets the USA, Canada, India, Japan 
and China and covers wine, fruit, meat, dairy products, olive oil and organic product with a 
total budget of €18.2 million. 
 
 
 
 Table 1. Number of PDO and PGI Products in the European Union 
 
 Total Cheese Meat-based
Breads 
and 
bakery 
Oils Fish Beer Other drinks 
Fruits and 
vegetables 
Fresh 
meat 
Other 
animal 
products
Table 
olives Other 
Belgium 5 1 2 1 1         
Czech Republic 6   1  1 3       
Denmark 3 2            
Germany 67 4 8 4 1 2 12 31 2 3    
Greece 84 20  1 25 1   22  1 10 4 
Spain 105 19 10 7 20    30 13 3  3 
France 155 45 4 2 9 2  5 26 51 6 3 2 
Ireland 4 1 1   1    1    
Italy 159 32 28 3 38    47 2 2 2 5 
Luxemburg 4  1  1     1 1   
Netherlands 6 4       2     
Austria 12 6 2  1    3     
Poland 1 1            
Portugal 104 12 28  6    21 26 10 1  
Slovenia 1    1         
Finland 1        1     
Sweden 2 1  1          
United Kingdom 28 11    3 2 3 1 7 1   
Total 747 159 84 20 103 10 17 39 155 104 24 16 14 
 
Source: Compiled by authors from EU data available at http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/foodqual/quali1_en.htm (accessed October 2007). 
